The Schmitts - A Study Of One Family's Struggle To Defend Life, Business, Church, School and Community

This section presents a case study to bring to life the tactics and techniques described in the Strategy For Defense, Team Tactics and Unit Tactics manuals. 

The case study animates the threats faced by individuals, parents, business owners, church officials and school administrators. You will find the case study referred to in detail in the various manuals. We have extracted specific elements of the case study for presentation here without the detailed tactics and techniques discussion.

The case study is a composite construction of actual events and relationships experienced by the authors. Names and locations have been changed, and the resulting study, while the work of fiction, is representable of the realities facing many individuals, businesses and communities today. The setting for the case study is Detroit, a city that is a precursor for the conflicts to come. The case study includes:

1. The story of Auto Parts Distributors (APD), including it's founding, owners, employees and history.
2. A security briefing which describes the threats that confront APD.
3. A site survey detailing the physical premises.
4. Mission Essential Task List (METL) for the defense of APD.
5. Wargaming a gang assault on APD.
6. After Action Report (AAR) of an actual assault.

While this case study focuses on a business, the threats and defenses apply directly to schools and churches. MOST IMPORTANTLY, individuals who daily confront security issues - not just in their home - but also at work, in school, at church and in their community will gain by understanding their ability to contribute to their own security - wherever they go. 

 THE SCHMITTS

Frederick J. Schmitt IV wheeled his ten year-old Chevy Suburban into the parking lot of his 104 year-old company. Once again he had to zig-zag his way around beer cans, wine bottles and other crap left by the gangs, drug dealers, pimps and prostitutes that frequent this part of the city. He made a mental note to fire his latest security guard firm. Again. The third security firm he has had in three years. Fred parked in his usual spot, got out, and opened the back hatch to retrieve his briefcase crammed with the numbers he’d be covering with his bank and insurance company today, and made his way to the lobby entrance. 

As he unlocked the door and stepped in, Fred felt that familiar pang of pride as he crossed the threshold of his company, which was, unfortunately, accompanied by a major dose of anxiety, as he realized today’s meeting might be the end of the line for the company and his family. Automotive Parts Distributor was founded by his namesake and great-grandfather in 1910. The “original” Frederick Johan Schmitt immigrated from Germany as a young man bringing his wife and two boys with him. As a tool-maker back in Germany, young Fred had heard of the great things Henry Ford was doing in Detroit and wanted to be part of it. After landing at Ellis Island, and spending a year learning English with relatives in New York City, Fred struck out for Detroit to get a job with Henry Ford. 

Back in the day Henry Ford would hire anybody regardless of background or capabilities. Petty thieves, grifters, handicapped, men with no skills, men with no prospects knew they could get a chance working for Ford. Fred knew this, and thought his tool-making skills learned in Germany would allow him to step into a job making tools used in the assembly process. But he was wrong. Everybody at Ford back then started at the same point regardless of experience - or lack thereof. Fred’s first job was sweeping the floors, but soon enough he proved his potential to others and he found himself quickly moving around to other jobs, before landing in his coveted tool-maker position. Fred lasted a few years at Ford, long enough to save up money to start his own shop, fabricating tools and parts which he sold to the growing number of auto-makers in the Detroit area.  

Frederick Johan Schmitt was smart, bull-headed, worked like a dog, and was at the right place at the right time. His shop grew, the number of parts he produced grew, and soon he was even distributing parts made by other shops. By 1919, Fred’s shop had grown into Automotive Parts Distributors and employed 100 people. The Schmitt’s were not rich, but they were comfortable and masters of their own destiny. Fred would run the company he started for the next 50 years, through good times and bad, always staying about the same size and in the same business, until the day he died. Frederick Johan Schmitt, the first of his name, died at his desk at the ripe old age of 90. 

After Fred’s death, his son and grandson took over the reins and would run the company together for the next 40 years. During their tenure, son and grandson of the original Fred lived through the catastrophic decline of Detroit and the car business. While friends, competitors, vendors and suppliers were either going bankrupt or moving their businesses south or off-shore, the Schmitt’s doggedly stayed in Detroit. The Schmitt’s loved Michigan, the Great Lakes, the Upper Peninsula, the fishing and hunting. They loved Detroit, their kids went to public schools; they were huge Tiger fans and lived in the same neighborhood. The unions, the riots, the gangs, the EPA, OSHA, the Department of Labor, the corrupt city council and its leadership were not going to run them off. And they paid the price for their stubbornness, a price that Frederick J. Schmitt IV was about to learn. 

Fred made his way back to his office and glanced out the side window at the spot where his sister, Hannah, had been violently attacked and raped last year. She ran marketing for them, and one night had stayed late finishing up the print collaterals for a new product line they were launching. As she made for her car two gang members jumped her, beat her, and raped her. The on-duty security guard heard her screaming and was able to run them off before they killed her. His sister is Schmitt through and through, and although shaken to the core by her experience, she was back at work the next week. Shortly thereafter she bought herself a 40 calibre Glock 26 and got her concealed carry permit. She doesn’t talk about the rape; the two miscreants have not been caught - the overworked detectives filled out a complaint and later said they were probably back in Mexico. Fred gets just a little bit crazy everytime he thinks about it. His craziness driven by the guilt that he feels for having kept the company in Detroit but tempered by his sister’s bravery and resolute commitment to the family and company. Many times she has said “if we move they win and I will not allow them to beat us.” 

Flipping on his office light, Fred went over and fired up the coffee pot and sat down to review his numbers. He still had a couple of hours before the bank and insurance people arrived. His operating numbers were good, not great, but not bad for a distribution business operating in a highly competitive business. APD did almost $50 million in revenue over the past 12 months and generated close to a 5% operating profit which was profit before taxes. He employed almost 250 people, and the size of the business hadn’t changed much in 40 years. In addition to being bullheaded the Schmitt’s are also no-bullshit, and while other companies in the 80’s were doing crazy leveraged buyouts, building unsustainable mini-congomerates and launching new businesses without a clue, the Schmitts, stuck to their knitting. The company had always been profitable. After paying the family members modest salaries, bonuses to the employees and investing in plant and equipment, each year they would sock a little bit into a rainy day fund. 

The reason for the visit from the financial guys was not his operating results, but his inventory and the risks associated with continuing to lend against his inventory. Over the past ten years, APD had four major thefts of its inventory. Each one involved more than $500,000 of loss. Each time it happened the bank would get stiffed, and the insurance company would have to step up and repay the bank. Each time it happened his insurance rates doubled. His property insurance premiums had grown to the point where he could no longer afford to pay them. APD’s inventory was an attractive target for two reasons; first, it is easy to convert stolen auto parts into cash, and, second, APD had over the years gravitated towards the more expensive, higher margin parts like electronics, imported tires, speciality rims, etc., which were highly valued by thieving criminals.

The meeting was scheduled for 9:00 am. Fred laughed as he watched the bankers brand new Cadillac Escalade pull up into the parking lot. Driving a brand new Escalade in this part of town was tantamount to waving a red flag in front of a bull. The banker and the insurer got out and nervously looked around before heading into the lobby. Fred met them in his boardroom where he greeted each one with a firm handshake and steady gaze. His banker, who had been the company’s lending officer for 20 years would not look him directly in the eyes. Fred knew his fate was sealed. The meeting was short. He didn’t need his numbers. The insurance company was redlining all of Detroit and no longer insuring any companies. The banker said they were “rolling up” all their loans in Detroit and were pulling out of the market altogether. The banker knew exactly the position into which he was placing Fred. He told Fred he had 90 days to repay his $10 million revolving line of credit and suggested he get to work figuring out how to repay his loan. Fred told the banker to go fuck himself.  

After they had left Fred suddenly realized, he felt good about what happened. It felt good to tell the banker to go fuck himself. He never cared for the guy. It wasn’t until the early 80’s that the company first took on any debt at all. But that was out of extreme circumstances brought on by an onslaught of State and Federal agencies who almost put APD out of business.   

Up until the early 80’s, APD ran a small metal stamping and forming business that produced APD parts, and, parts for other companies.  It was a nice solid business that just about ran itself. One day the government came calling. An alphabet soup of State and Federal agencies descended upon APD at the same time. By the time they were done, APD was looking at more than a $1 million in fines and another $3 million in capital improvements - if they wanted to stay in business. The stamping operations required all kinds of sound abatement modifications, and they were going to have to excavate almost a quarter acre of concrete and 20 feet of soil in order to remove any residual chemicals that may have leaked into the ground going all the way back to the start of the company. Fred’s father was up against the wall. The company did not have that kind of money just sitting around, so they decided to shut down the stamping business and then took out a loan to cover the fines and soil remediation efforts. 

The meeting had taken 20 minutes. It was now 9:30 in the morning on a beautiful summer Friday. Fred walked backed to his office flipped off the lights, grabbed his car keys and told his admin that he would be gone for the day. Driving out of his lot, he noticed his maintenance guys had cleaned up the crap in the parking lot and were cutting the grass. The Schmitt’s always took care of their stuff. Fred wasn’t sure where he was going or what he was doing; he just needed time to think. He drove for the next couple of hours on automatic pilot revisiting the sights and places in grew up with as a kid; Tiger Stadium, Belle Isle, Woodward, Hudsons, Greektown. He fondly remembered their Thanksgiving Day ritual, first the Hudson’s parade then the Lions game. He drove out through the nightmarish remains of the old River Rouge facilities recalling his grandfather’s stories of what it was like during the day. Driving back into the city center, Fred came upon the new Downtown spearheaded by Dan Gilbert and was impressed with the improvements. he recalled how security ahd been front and center for Gilbert who had to create his own police force.

Politics was never front and center in the Schmitt family, they were always too busy working, keeping their head down and minding their own business. Most turn of the century German immigrants were the same way… they knew first hand the dangers of tyranny, letting one man, backed by a political party loose on everybody else. Like his father and grandfather, Fred served in the Marines as an enlisted man, ostensibly fighting for liberty. His grandfather’s war was WWII; his dad’s was Viet Nam, and Fred’s was the first Gulf War. He kept in touch with a few Marine Corp buddies - his best friend being another German, who was a sniper and a firearms training instructor. He made a mental note to call him.

Fred found himself pulling into his driveway. He was in a daze barely remembering how he got there. His wife came out to greet him wondering why he was home so early and then she looked at his face. Fred felt an overwhelming sense of loss, the company, the city, his employees, his family. Fred had lost the game, as he began facing the reality.  His initial exuberance in telling the banker to go fuck himself had swung to total despair with the reality of having to liquidate the company. His wife took him by the arm and guided him inside while Fred told her about the results of the meeting. She was a spitfire; they met in high school; both went to Michigan State, and she knew him inside and out. She suggested they leave immediately for their little lake cottage and talk things through. They needed to be back by Sunday afternoon for their weekly family dinner a ritual that went back to the original Fred. Which would also be a good time to announce to the rest of the family the results of the meeting with the bank. 

The lake was four hours away. The family had a small cottage on Glen Lake built by his grandfather. His wife was right, the drive, combined with some fishing and relaxation was what he needed to clear his head. As they headed out towards I-94 Fred couldn’t help but notice just how bad things were getting in his neighborhood. The Schmitts had long owned houses in the Boston-Edison district going back to Fred the first. While there were some large houses and even mansions built by some of Detroit’s “first” families” the Schmitt’s opted for the smaller more modest 3 and 4 bedroom homes just right for raising families. The Schmitts lived in a 4 bedroom turn-of-the-century home with a dining room and living area large enough to host the Sunday dinners. 

Fred and his wife had three kids, two attending MSU and one graduated. The two in college lived at home over the summer, and both worked at APD. Fred was always concerned for their safety and had reluctantly put them in private schools back in the late 90’s. But even the private schools were no longer a safe option. As they passed their church on the way to the entrance of 1-94, he saw the homeless sleeping on the steps. As he punched the accelerator and guided the Suburban into expressway traffic it occurred to him that while he was always aware of the state of decline in Detroit, it wasn’t until today and the meeting with the bankers, followed by his drive through Detroit, that he began to acknowledge the real scale of the problems. Detroit was bankrupt. The city was a rotting shell. No law enforcement. Few city services. The economy was shot. The auto industry a farce of what it had been. And nobody on the horizon with a realistic plan to bring back Detroit. Maybe his banker had done him a favor.

By the time Fred reached the lake he was convinced that his only course of action was to liquidate the company. By the time they got done selling off their inventory, equipment and the land and building, then repaying the bank, taxes, etc., they might clear $1 million. Fred was the largest equity holder but even still he would only see 20% of the proceeds. The rest would be distributed to his mother, brother and sister and various aunts and uncles. All told there were 10 other equity holders in the business that had a say in what happens and a distribution of the net proceeds from a sale or liquidation. It was then that Fred was struck by a thunderbolt resulting from the realization that if he did liquidate the business he would have to go to work for somebody else. The proceeds were not enough to live on through retirement and while they had comfortable savings built up it was not enough to retire on. Fred wasn’t sure where he could go to get a job in this economy and with his experience. He was 45 years old. His industry was dying, and his business model antiquated, compared to other distribution models like Amazon.

It was almost 9:00 in the evening when the pulled up to the cottage. The first thing they saw was his sister’s vehicle. He had completely forgotten that she was up here with her husband and two young kids. Fred had a great relationship with his little sister, and she was the perfect sounding board for ideas about the company. He was relieved to see her there. They opened the door and were greeted by a puzzled look by her sister. She then saw the look on Fred’s face and simply said “shit”. She knew about the bank meeting and had been anxiously awaiting the news all day. After getting settled, putting the kids to bed and getting a bite of dinner the four of them sat out on the deck and went through the various options open to family.

The driving factor in their analysis was repaying the bank. They owed $10 million which had to be repaid in 90 days.  There were three simple options at this point for repaying the bank. First, they could sell the business. Second, they could liquidate the business. And third, they could look for a replacement lender. Selling the business as a going-concern was not an option due to many requirements placed on the business back in 1985 by the EPA and OSHA in the event of a change in ownership. Refinancing the business would be tough if not impossible because of the reasons their existing lender had pulled out. Which left liquidating the business as the only apparent solution. All four of them sat on the deck looking dejectedly at the lake. It was a full moon, not a cloud in the sky and the lake was shimmering, but none of them could appreciate it. They all got up at once and shuffled off to bed. There was nothing else to talk about.

Saturday morning was not much better. Fred was feeling like a trapped animal; he had no viable options, at least if wanted to continue doing what he loved. He can’t sell it; he can’t refinance it, and while he pays back the bank in liquidation, he essentially walks away with nothing. The more the reality sank in, the angrier he got. His sister was worse than he was. And although she could go out and probably get a better job than what she had with APD she was a SCHMITT. A year ago she went through a horrific attack in the parking lot of her company and if that wasn’t enough to scare her off, then this sure as hell wouldn’t. By noon, dejection had catalyzed into anger fueled by the feeling that they had done nothing wrong. For more than 100 years this family had kept its head down, worked like dogs, never asking for anything it hadn’t earned and now, due to a complete and total breakdown of government, they were paying the price. 

It was Hannah who shed the first ray of hope. Over lunch she started talking about the only way to win this fight was to network with other like minded Michiganders; wealthy, patriotic, conservative families, many third, and fourth generation auto families. Collectively, she speculated, they might be a source of financing for APD and other firms facing their same dilemma. Fred's wife wasn't so sure reminding Hannah how most of the families had long ago abandoned tradition and conservatism in favor of liberal causes. Hannah agreed with her mother but also felt that there were enough left that might invest in a fund. After all, these families had a vested interest in the success of Detroit, perhaps there was a way to organize a venture capital fund to invest in companies like APD. The more Hannah thought about it the more promise it held and soon she and her mom were making a list of contacts they would approach.

That Saturday afternoon, once again sitting on the deck, and a feasible financing plan on the table, he began to put things in perspective. Fred had never been a fan of government. He did the bare minimum to comply with taxes, regulations, etc. as did the other Schmitt’s throughout the company history. Both his wife and sister were much more politically aware than he was. Over the past couple of years he heard one eruption after another from them - Benghazi, the IRS, NSA, Snowden, Holder, Illegal Immigrants, amnesty, etc., etc. They even got into a minor brawl over Ron Paul and Mitt Romney with his sister voting for Ron Paul. The only thing he knew about Ron Paul back then was that he wanted to legalize drugs and was weak on defense, but now his comments on the Federal Reserve, and limited government and other details he recalled suddenly were making sense. 

Fred realized that he had unconsciously delegated certain aspects of his life to government - most importantly his security. And his sister had paid a very personal price for this oversight. Rather than fleeing, it occurred to Fred that the best way to proceed was to stay and fight. To take back control. Take back control of his life, his family, neighborhood and business. The most important weapon he had in his fight was his business - because it provided the sustenance of his self-reliance. But in order to run his business not only did he have to get it on an entirely new financial footing he would also have to learn how to defend his business from attack by thieves, criminals and civil disturbance. Because the police department wasn’t doing it for him, his insurance company wasn’t doing it for him, the courts wouldn’t do it for him, and neither would the Detroit City Council, Wayne County, the State of Michigan or the government of the United States of America.  

Fred finally came to the realization that he alone was responsible for his liberty. And at the top of the list in securing his liberty was security, the security of his family, his business, his church, the schools and his community. And the only way to win this fight was to network with other like minded Detroiters who understood that everything started with them, and through them they could do better, faster and much more effectively almost everything government has tried to do in the past. Beginning with their security. 

Which is when he reached for his cell phone and called his old Marine Corp buddy “Silent Bob”. 

Fred Schmitt came to the conclusion that every self-reliant American needs to come to; that he is responsible for his security. And that before he can defend his family, business, church or community he must first learn how to defend himself. 

The first step Fred took was to sit down and compose a security briefing that he could share with “Silent Bob”. 

THE APD INC. SECURITY BRIEFING

Name: Auto Parts Distribution, Inc. (APD)

Industry: Automotive

Founded: 1910

Location: Detroit MI.

Revenue: $50 million

Employees: 250

Ownership: Private

Facilities: Single Building - 35,000 Square Feet

HISTORY

Auto Parts Distribution, Inc. (ADP) is a long established distributor of auto parts. ADP was founded in Detroit in 1910 and is still controlled by members of the founding family. The company remained in Detroit because of civic pride and deep roots in the community. Most of APD’s competitors, suppliers and customers have either moved south or offshore.  

BUSINESS

APD distributes parts directly to auto manufacturers, to original equipment manufacturers (OEM’s) who incorporate APD parts into sub-assemblies and to retail stores located in the upper midwest. The company maintains a small fleet of vans that provide same day deliveries to customers in the Detroit area and also provide deliveries to retail store customers. 

ADP maintains a large inventory of finished auto parts to service its customer base. Many of these parts are expense finished products ranging from tires to electronics and engine parts. The primary business function is picking, packing and shipping or delivering  parts to customers. 

There are three major groups of employees: laborers (150) who pick, pack, ship and deliver parts; customer service reps (50) who maintain daily phone contact with their customer base and management/adminstrative support personnel (50). 

FACILITIES

The company operates out of a single building located in the I-94 Industrial Park Renaissance Zone. The location is in a high crime section of Detroit. The facility is a 1960’s vintage “tilt-up” single story structure made of concrete walls. The building is approximately 35,000 square feet in a simple rectangular layout. There is a 10 foot security fence enclosing the property although the entrance is not guarded or controlled. 

The interior of the building is divided into three main areas - management and administrative offices, a call center and inventory/packing/shipping. All interior walls are drywall. The shipping floor is made up of rows of 20 foot high steel inventory racks, packing tables and two gated secure locations for high value inventory items. 

The company maintains a small fleet of delivery vans which are parked inside the facility when not in use or after hours. Parking for employees is in front and along the sides of the building. 

SECURITY ISSUES

The company is experiencing security threats on several fronts. The current Chairman/CEO has been under pressure by other family members to move or sell the business due to these escalating threats. A major security issue is inventory. The high dollar value of many of the parts, combined with how easy it is convert stolen auto parts into cash, combine to make the business an attractive target for thieves and other predators. Despite these escalating threats, the CEO is committed to staying in Detroit and will do what he needs to defend his business and employees. These are the major security issues he currently faces:

1. Random violence. The location of the company makes it an attractive target for opportunistic predators looking to steal cars, mug employees, assaults, rapes, etc. This violence takes place primarily in the parking lot and entrance to the company facilities. 

2. Pilferage. There have been several instances in the recent past where employees were caught stealing inventory. Two had to be violently escorted from the premises.

3. Organized gangs. The company was recently attacked in broad daylight by gang members who ransacked the inventory and made off with tires, batteries, radios, flat screen monitors, etc. 

4. Organized crime. The mafia in the past has attempted to use the business to “launder parts” from a network of “chop” shops in the city. They violently assaulted managers and family members attempting to convince them to do business.  

5. Organized labor. The UAW has been trying to organize the shipping floor for many years. At times the organizing efforts have resulted in violence and there are rumors that union rats have infiltrated the company and are threatening and coercing employees. 

6. Lack of police. Dwindling resources and the recent bankruptcy has significantly reduced the police presence and response time. It took the police two weeks to respond to the brazen daylight robbery.

7. Disgruntled employees. The company has a high turnover rate due to inconsistent work habits of many employees, and many of these with drug or other behavioral problems that impact their work effort. Several have become violent when terminated.  

8. Inconsistent security. The company has used several local security guard firms, but none have been consistent in supplying capable guards and they have been ineffective in handling the security threats to date. 

9. Insurance. The company’s insurance cost has sky-rocketed while covering significantly less in terms of losses and claims. The most crippling effect is a cap on inventory losses which limits the payout in situations of major theft or robbery. Inventory is the lifeblood of the company and they cannot function without having significantly more than the insurance cap allows. Which means that if a significant theft occurred the company and family would go bankrupt. 

SCENARIOS

The company currently deals with these escalating threats by utilizing local security guard firms who typically supply 4 full time “guards” during working hours and 2 full time “guard” during “off” hours. This number will fluctuate depending upon time of year and circumstances. The company pays $35,000 a month on average for out-sourced security services. 

The CEO and his management team are most concerned about the follow scenario threats:

1. Violent Assaults. Employees violently assaulted in the parking lot before and after shifts - primarily thefts but rape is also a concern.

2. Disgruntled Employee. A terminated employee returns with a weapon and opens fire.

3. Organized Theft. A local gang in concert with several locally owned auto parts “dealers” attempts to raid the facilities. 

4. Civil Disturbance. Local residents rise up and start rioting due to lack of services, etc and threaten to loot and burn the facility. 

VULNERABILITIES

Based upon the above descriptions APD can characterize it’s primary vulnerabilities as follows:

1. Premises. Employees and their property are vulnerable to theft and violent attack. There is currently no gate or controlled access onto the premises.

2. Inventory. The inventory is highly fungible and therefore an attractive target of petty theft, pilferage and organized criminals. 

3. Financial. Inventory is the lifeblood of APD. Due to the actions of their bank and insurance company the very existence of the company is dependent upon defending this inventory. 

MISSION BRIEF

Fred Schmitt decides to take his security in-house and form his own private security force. This is the brief he wrote describing the purpose of the new organization.

Name: APD Private Security (APDPS).

Mission: The mission of APDPS is to provide 24/7 security for the employees and facilities of Auto Parts Distributors Inc.

Strategy: Establish a new departmental function at APD called “Security” and staff it with trained employees who provide security as an extension of the current jobs. 

Objectives:

1. Develop a cadre of highly-trained motivated employees to provide security.

2. Develop a comprehensive recurrent training program for APDPS.

3. Develop a comprehensive response plan by APDPS for these scenarios:

a. Violent assault.

b. Disgruntled employee - active shooter.

c. Organized theft.

d. Civil disturbance - riot, looting, arson.

4. Specify and purchase necessary weaponry, ammunition and accessories for APDPS.

5. Establish APDPS as a separate entity with proper licensing and insurance.

6. Extend basic firearms training to employees who want to conceal carry or learn basic firearms defense tactics.

7. Build a 4 lane 50 yard indoor range for security force and employee training.

8. Subsidize purchase of weapons and ammo for all employees not part of APDPS… $500 per year. 

Since you have already listed and described threats, the next step is to grade each threat for probability (how likely is it to occur?) and consequence (how dangerous is it, if it does occur?). For each threat you have defined, assign an X value – how likely is this threat to materialize? – from 1 (highly improbable) to 5 (highly probable).  Then assign a Y value – how serious would the consequences be? – from 1 (low consequence) to 5 (highest consequence).  

Consider and grade each threat in turn. For instance, a takeover by a large armed foreign terrorist group that could put at risk your entire workforce would probably be one of your most dangerous threats – a “5”– but you may consider it highly unlikely if your business is like Fred Schmitt’s APD, distributing auto parts in Detroit.  If you were constructing a threat assessment for a large synagogue in the suburbs of New York, you might consider such an event considerably more likely, but still less likely than a non-violent protest or a lone active shooter.  

This is a subjective exercise, so it is advisable to undertake it in a group to minimize the effect of any one person’s biases.  If you work through your list of threats with rigorous, deductive analysis, you will end up with a list of your threats graded something like this (An abbreviated list loosely based on our APD case study):

• Threat 
• Brief description
• Probability
• Consequence

1. Armed group takeover Terrorist group, well-armed, politically motivated, with extensive planning and preparation.

• Probability: 1
• Consequence: 5

2. Nonviolent labor dispute. Union seeking to organize workers pickets the property, obstructing operations and intimidating workers, staff, customers.

• Probability: 4
• Consequence: 2

3. Lone active shooter. Disgruntled or psychologically disturbed former employee randomly or selectively targets personnel.

• Probability: 2
• Consequence: 4

4. Pilferage. Employee pilfers from company inventory or equipment for personal gain.

• Probability: 5
• Consequence: 1

5. Random violence outside. Individual or group assault on employee(s) outside building. 

• Probability: 5
• Consequence: 4

6. Organized gang theft. Group attack to steal business property, inventory.

• Probability: 5
• Consequence: 3

The next step is to position each graded threat on your Threat Matrix graph.

EXHIBIT 3.2: APD Graded threat matrix.

Now you begin to have something actionable. Given that time and resources for addressing threats will always be limited, this Graded Threat approach gives you a basis for prioritizing your efforts. Threats in the More Likely/More Dangerous quadrant should receive early and sustained attention in your planning and resource allocation.  The Less Likely/Less Dangerous quadrant contains threats to which you can confidently devote less effort.  The other two quadrants require some careful analysis and decision making – are you more concerned over likelihood, or consequence?

Regardless of the degree of rigor you apply to your threat assessment, it needs to be updated at need – whenever significant information/intelligence with a high confidence level comes to your attention – and on a regular basis.  Bring in trusted associates for every review, school them on your process if it is new to them, and let them bring a fresh perspective to the problem.

EXHIBIT 4.1 APD floorplan.

EXHIBIT 4.2 APD site plan.

EXHIBIT 4.3: APD Survey schematic.

APD Site Survey

1. MISSION: Continue business operations during normal working hours, protecting personnel, physical plant, and inventory from hostile threats.

2. TYPE:  Commercial building on fenced property

3. SIZE:  Ten acre property, within which a perimeter fence surrounds approximately one acre of parking lot and a 130 x 220’ building 

4. COMPLEXITY: One-story building; no additional structures.  Perimeter fence constitutes minor delay to foot movement from three sides; lack of a gate or control point results in no control or delay of access by vehicle or by foot from the street.   

5. AREAS

a. Employee/Visitor Parking.

b. Executive Parking.

c. Production Floor: encompassing order fulfillment area, bulk inventory, shipping/receiving, and restrooms.

d. High Value Inventory.

e. Customer Support.

f. Technical Support.

g. Break Room.

h. Marketing.

i. Lobby and Office Storage.

j. Board Room and Executive Offices.

6. PATHWAYS

a. Interior (PI)

PI-1.1, 1.2, 1.3: Key-locked double doors between Production Floor and High Value Inventory

PI-2.1, 2.2: two lockable doors between Customer Support and Production Floor

PI-3.1, 3.2: two lockable doors between Technical Support and Production Floor

PI-3.3: lockable door between Technical Support and Center Hall

PI-4.1: lockable door between Marketing and Center Hall

PI-4.2, 4.3: two lockable doors between Marketing and Front Hall

PI-5: one-way lockable double fire doors between Lobby and Front Hall

PI-6.1 through PI-6.8: Doors between Boardroom and Executive Offices, and Front Hall

PI-7: Front Hall 

PI-8: Hallway Intersection

PI-9: Center Hall

PI-9.1: Fire Door, Center Hall

PI-10.1, 10.2: Doors between Center Hall and Break Room

b. Exterior (PX):

PX-1: Front doors (unlocked during business hours)

PX-2: Door, east end of long hall (key locked, executives have keys)

PX-3: Accordion doors on SW wall for shipping/receiving

PX-4: Drive gate through perimeter fence into parking lot

PX-5.1 thru PX-5.9: Large exterior windows, one each, in executive offices & boardroom (all other windows are too small to admit passage of humans)

Fire exits (one way only): numbered clockwise from 

Technical Support,PX-6, PX-7, PX-8, PX-9, PX-10

7. TARGETS (TGT)

a. TGT-1 High Value Inventory

TYPE – Storage room, with three key-locked double doors from production floor, fire exit on NE exterior wall, and lockable wire cages for inventory shelves, bins, and racks

LOCATION – North corner of building 

TARGET ATTRACTIVENESS – 0.8 for theft, due to transportability and resale value of items

TARGET CONSEQUENCE VALUE: 0.6 due to replacement cost and delays in order fulfillment

THREAT OBJECTIVE(S) – (1) Theft, (2) Vandalism to impact business operations

b. TGT-2 Bulk Inventory

TYPE – 20’ steel inventory racks in open grid 

LOCATION – On Production Floor, along NE long wall of building, contiguous with order fulfillment work area

TARGET CONSEQUENCE VALUE: 0.3

ATTRACTIVENESS: 0.2 for theft, due to difficulty of transporting bulk quantities and low unit resale value

THREAT OBJECTIVE(S):  (1) Vandalism to impact business operations, (2) Theft

c. TGT-3 Computers & Office Equipment

TYPE – Individual work stations

LOCATION – Board Room and Executive Offices, Lobby, Marketing, Technical Support, Customer Support 

TARGET CONSEQUENCE VALUE - 0.4 for delays and disruption resulting from data loss

TARGET ATTRACTIVENESS - 0.5 for theft due to portability and resale potential 

THREAT OBJECTIVE(S) - (1) Theft, (2) Data Theft, (3) Vandalism

d. TGT-4 Privately owned vehicles and their contents in parking lots

TYPE – Personal property

LOCATION – TGT-4S: Employee parking lot south of building; TGT-4E: Visitor parking in front of building; TGT-4N: Executive parking lot north of building

TARGET CONSEQUENCE VALUE - 0.3

TARGET ATTRACTIVENESS – 0.9 for ease of access and escape

THREAT OBJECTIVE(S) – (1) Theft of vehicles or contents, (2) Vandalism

e. TGT-5 Executive Personnel

TYPE – + 10 officers and managers

LOCATION – Board Room and Executive Offices; routes to/from NE parking lot; throughout building during working hours

TARGET CONSEQUENCE VALUE - 0.9

TARGET ATTRACTIVENESS - 0.9 for kidnapping, 0.7 for intimidation/assault 

THREAT OBJECTIVE(S) – Kidnapping, Assault  

f. TGT-6 Workers

TYPE - + 220 personnel

LOCATION – Throughout building during working hours, nominal distribution as shown on diagram; routes to/from SW and SE parking lots

TARGET CONSEQUENCE VALUE – 0.9

TARGET ATTRACTIVENESS – Threat dependent; 0.3 for kidnapping, .8 for assault, theft, intimidation

THREAT OBJECTIVE(S) – Assault, theft, and/or intimidation inside or outside building in conjunction with any primary strategy 

8. TIME WINDOW:  Weekday working hours between 8:30am and 3:00pm, when entire workforce is present. 

Prior security incidents – Review internal reports of daylight gang robbery event, parking lot incidents, and organized crime actions to identify patterns or methods of attack that might be repeated

9. PROTECTION LAYERS

a. PHYSICAL BARRIERS AND OBSTACLES

Lobby and Front Hall exterior doors are single pane tempered glass in steel frame with deadbolt locks (thumb turn inside, cylinder lock outside).  Lobby door is unlocked during business hours.  Front Hall door remains locked, but executives each carry key and routinely use door for entry/egress during day.

Exterior doors PX-6 through PX-10, and interior hallway doors PI-5 and PI-9.1 are steel fire doors in steel frames with push bars which can be hex-key locked from the ‘inside’ position (Exterior doors are routinely locked into one-way ‘exit only’ mode).  They are highly resistant to mechanical breaching.

Accordion doors PX-3 in Shipping and Receiving are highly resistant to mechanical breaching when secured, but constitute significant security hazard as they stand open in the summer or are opened and closed during winter, for delivery vans. 

Interior doors of offices and admin areas are light gauge steel with windows in upper third, with deadbolt locks comparable to exterior doors, providing moderate resistance to mechanical breaching.  Restroom doors are solid, swinging doors without locks. 

Parking Lot Fence – 10’ chain link perimeter fence around one acre parking lot restricts vehicular traffic from Interstate frontage road to one entry-exit point.  

Entry is open, two lanes wide, with no gates or control points. Fence can be climbed but removal of large items would require breach of fence. Fence delays but does not prevent entry at any point. Nine undeveloped acres surrounding lot on three sides are effectively uncontrolled and unmonitored.

Concrete exterior walls are effectively impenetrable.  Exterior windows (PX-5.1 – 5.8) along front of building are non-operating single pane tempered glass, vulnerable to breakage and entry.  Non-operating 8” x 72” windows on both long walls are vulnerable to breakage but impractical for entry.  There is no roof access into building.  

Floor is poured slab.

Interior walls are drywall, do not constitute cover from gunfire and could be breached mechanically.

b. HUMAN

Four contract security guards on duty during working hours. Supervisor and one guard roam throughout building and around building perimeter on irregular schedule; one guard is posted in Lobby, and one in Shipping/Receiving.

General observation by occupants/employees – Vehicles enter property from the road within the field of view from all executive offices and the lobby.  Receptionist and security guard in lobby, roving security guards, and executives in offices and boardroom may detect suspicious activity by vehicles or personnel entering fenced lot, probability of detection is low and highly variable.  Delivery van drivers come and go at irregular intervals throughout the day and might detect pre-attack indicators on or near the property, or off-normal conditions in the community.

Response force: none.  Police response, based upon recent experience, is measured in days or weeks.

Communications – Business phone system with wall sets in each admin room, desk sets at each desk or work station. PA system with speakers throughout building, can be operated from lobby and manager offices only. All managers and most employees have personal cellular phones. 

Escape/evacuation routes and areas – in event of fire, all personnel evacuate into employee parking lots SW and NE of building.  Given local conditions, shelter in place is preferable to evacuation in the event of security threat.

c. COLLECTION PLAN 

Site tour will identify or confirm accessibility of property from off-site (avenues of approach and escape for adversaries); placement and characteristics of building exterior doors and surfaces, their resistance to penetration and status (open/closed, locked/unlocked) during specified time window

Assemble architectural diagrams, site plans, imagery from archives and public-access governmental and online sources.

Interview – Officers, executives, and department heads, with follow-up as indicated with same or additional personnel.

Previous site or security surveys – NONE 

APD Private Security METL 

1.0 Manage Security Cadre

CONDITION: Under normal operating conditions
STANDARD: Maintain manning and readiness adequate to meet defined threats with minimal negative impact on business operations
TASK STEPS:

1. Resolve threats successfully.
2. Evaluate readiness by conducting exercises against each defined high priority threat at least once annually.
3. Maintain a sufficient number of trained security personnel to fill all identified guard and response roles.
4. Receive positive quarterly reports from department heads regarding impact of cadre's security duties on departmental business operations.

CRITICAL SUPPORTING TASKS

1. Recruit and Sustain Security Cadre.

CONDITION: Under normal operating conditions
STANDARDS:

1. 1. Incentives and inducements attract sufficient qualified volunteers.
   2. Volunteers meet established standard for selection.
   3. Recruits successfully complete initial security cadre training
   4. Cadre members meet all recurrent training requirements.
   5. Turnover rate of personnel does not exceed the company's ability to conduct initial and recurrent training.

b. Organize Security Cadre.

CONDITION: Under normal operating conditions
STANDARD: Create and staff security organization capable of meeting 24/7 security requirements with minimal impact on business operations.

TASK STEPS:

1. Ensure that security manning during and outside normal business hours is consistently adequate to meet defined threats, as determined by exercises and analysis.
2. Receive positive quarterly reports from department heads regarding impact of cadre's security duties on departmental business operations.
3. Develop leaders.

2.0 Equip Security Cadre

CONDITION: Under normal operating conditions
STANDARD: Select, procure, issue, account for, and maintain all security-related equipment
CRITICAL SUPPORTING TASKS:

1. Select Equipment
2. Procure Equipment
3. Maintain Equipment
4. Manage Security Adjunct program

3.0 Manage Security Training

CONDITION: Under normal operating conditions
STANDARD: Provide effective initial and recurrent training for APDPS personnel and Security Adjuncts
CRITICAL SUPPORTING TASKS:

1. Establish training requirements
2. Develop training
3. Conduct cadre training [initial, recurrent]
4. Conduct Security Adjunct training [initial, recurrent]

4.0 Develop and Maintain Response Plans for Identified High Priority Threats

CONDITION: Under normal operating conditions, given a current graded Threat Assessment, Site Survey, Vulnerability Analysis, and/or management direction.
STANDARD: Current, realistic and actionable plans for all high priority threats are disseminated, trained, rehearsed, and reviewed on a regular basis.
TASK STEPS (for each plan):

1. Prepare plan.
2. Assess and refine plan via tabletop analysis, TEWT, and (where possible) force-on-force exercises.
3. Train security personnel in execution of plan.
4. Familiarize all managerial and supervisory personnel with the plan.
5. Brief and drill workforce in their particular roles and responsibilities.
6. Review plan quarterly, update in accordance with threat intelligence and changing conditions, apprise management of required changes, and implement changes through retraining and drills.

5.0 Obtain And Maintain Proper Licensing And Insurance

6.0 Build & Operate Indoor Shooting Range

7.0 Perform Routine Security Tasks:

CONDITION: Under normal operating conditions
STANDARD: Monitor and control property and building access, and respond to incidents reports of illegal, suspicious, or threatening behavior.
TASK STEPS:

1. Avoid surprise by early detection of possible threats.
2. Respond swiftly to reports of illegal, suspicious, or threatening behavior without compromising remaining security interests/requirements.
3. Resolve incidents in accordance with legal standards, organizational policy and doctrine, and management direction.

SUPPORTING TASKS:

1. 7.01 Conduct Listening Post/Observation Post Operations
2. 7.02 Conduct Guard Post Operations
3. 7.03 Conduct Security Patrol Operations
4. 7.04 Respond to Alarm, Intrusion, or Distress Call

8.0 Defeat Security Threat

CONDITION: A threat is underway or imminent against APD personnel, operations, or facilities. Teams have successfully oriented to the situation through direct observation, communication with friendly elements, mission analysis, and an understanding of their responsibilities and commander's intent.
STANDARDs: Security cadre selects and applies basic small team tactical skills appropriate to the situation, according to plan, as directed, or on initiative as the situation demands.
SUPPORTING TASKS:

8.01 Defend
CONDITION: Armed adversary group is active in the area of operations, and use of lethal force is justified. Friendly forces have a requirement to defend a specified area. Mission analysis is complete.
STANDARD: The threat is engaged in accordance with the defensive plan. Control of the specified area or terrain is retained, and the adversary is destroyed or repelled.
TASK STEPS:

1. Issue warning order to subunits and all security cadre personnel.
2. Make a tentative plan (or select applicable, prepared contingency plan).
3. Conduct reconnaissance to confirm mission analysis assumptions and provide early warning of changes in conditions.
4. Begin necessary movement/deployment of personnel, and other preparations.
5. Complete or revise the plan based on continuing analysis and received intelligence or reconnaissance reports.
6. Occupy positions:

1. 1. Establish and maintain security via observation posts (OP).
   2. Position key weapons and individuals.
   3. Ensure clear and overlapping fields of fire.
   4. Emplace early warning devices and obstacles as available.
   5. Establish communications (or confirm communications SOP).
   6. Maintain a reserve if possible, and be prepared to react to the unexpected.

g. Engage the adversary with effective fire in order to defeat the attack.
h. Consolidate and reorganize, establish accountability, manage casualties, and prepare to receive another attack or transition to another mission.

DISCUSSION: Given adequate force and circumstances, we will defend our area, premises, personnel, and operations against any violent threat. We will have all the advantages of the defense: operating on known ground, fighting from preselected covered and/or concealed positions against adversaries who must move against us, in a scenario we have (hopefully!) addressed in planning, wargaming, and rehearsals.

8.02 Delay
CONDITION: Armed adversary group threatens personnel or vital assets in the operating area, and cannot be stopped or defeated with immediately available forces. Use of lethal force is justified.
STANDARD: Delay or interdict adversary movement or task accomplishment, in order to allow lockdown or evacuation of personnel/assets and accumulation of friendly combat power.
TASK STEPS:

1. Designate rally point(s)
2. Divide available forces into mutually supporting elements
3. Select and occupy temporary fighting positions with covered retreat routes
4. Delay or interdict adversary with well-directed fire
5. Move by covered bounds to the rear if pressed

8.03 Utilize Team Formations and Techniques of Movement
CONDITION: During team movement in the operating area, hostile contact is possible or expected.
STANDARD: Establish contact with the threat as directed or on initiative. Minimize delay, unnecessary engagements, and friendly casualties. Maintain situational awareness.
TASK STEPS:

1. Choose appropriate formation and technique of movement
2. Move on advantageous route
3. Maintain situational awareness and 360-degree, three-dimensional security during movement
4. Use available cover and concealment
5. Accumulate combat power by linking up with other friendly elements
6. Make contact from a position of advantage

DISCUSSION: A detailed treatment of these topics can be found in Chapter 2 of this manual. Note that from a METL standpoint, we do not dictate techniques but only define the acceptable outcome, "what good looks like," in the Standard. The Task Steps provide somewhat more resolution and some recommendations, but still do not dictate or prescribe techniques. If a team chose to move in a circus gymnast's stacked pyramid, or crawl backwards in line, and was (somehow) able to meet the task Standard by doing so, criticism would have to be tempered by an acknowledgement of initiative, and success.

8.04 Perform Close Quarter Battle (CQB) Tactics and Techniques
CONDITION: Armed adversaries occupy a structure or complex of structures and use of lethal force is justified.
STANDARD: Clear objective building(s) of all adversaries, avoid unnecessary delay or friendly casualties.
DISCUSSION: These are complex and dangerous tasks, difficult enough for tactical teams which train hard and regularly for their performance. Pulse's Individual Tactics Manual introduces many of the critical concepts from the perspective of a lone operator who has is obliged by circumstances to operate alone. We can provide training across the entire spectrum for motivated and qualified small tactical teams.

SUBTASKS:

8.041 Establish and Utilize Objective Rally Point (ORP)
CONDITION: Armed adversary group is active in the area of operations, and use of lethal force is justified. Friendly forces must attack an identified objective.
STANDARD: Identify and secure an ORP for continued offensive maneuver.
TASK STEPS:

1. 1. Orient to objective and known or suspected enemy positions.
   2. Identify an ORP that can be reached by covered approaches and is protected from enemy observation and fire.
   3. Occupy the ORP.
   4. Communicate to other friendly elements.

DISCUSSION: An Objective Rally Point is defined as ". . . a point out of sight, sound, and small arms coverage of the objective area. It is where a unit can halt and perform final preparations before conducting actions at the objective and where the unit reassembles and reorganizes after completing actions on the objective." [footnote: U.S. Department of the Army, Light Infantry Company, Field Manual (FM) No. 7-71. Washington DC: HQDA 28 August 31, 1987, p. 3-29]

8.042 Conduct Team Movement in Urban Environment
CONDITION: The team must move through an urban environment wherein an armed adversary group occupies a structure or complex of structures in the operating area. Use of lethal force is justified.
STANDARD: Maneuver through urban or built-up area as required. Minimize friendly casualties and delay.
TASK STEPS:
a. Select routes to minimize exposure.
b. Adapt the standard techniques of team movement to urban terrain

1. 1. Travelling Overwatch: Used for speed, when contact is not likely. Move in a file, avoiding open areas and moving along (but not hugging) walls and buildings. Two men on point, one for forward security, the other for local security and cross coverage. Maintain 360 degree, spherical security bubble. Put eyes and muzzles on each window, door, and danger area as you pass. Take corners with two men, aggressively, but keep moving. Do not stop; maintain momentum.
   2. Bounding overwatch: Used when enemy contact is expected. If possible, move through or behind buildings. Establish two elements, even if these are only one man strong, and cover every movement with overwatch and (if necessary) fire from the stationary element. The support and maneuver roles will shift freely between elements during movement.

c. If you receive fire, seek hard cover, by entering the nearest accessible building if possible, and develop the situation by pinpointing the enemy position(s) and flanking them via covered routes. Do not attempt to fight hardened or concealed adversaries from the street.

DISCUSSION: In urban combat, historical experience indicates that as many as 90% of casualties occur in the streets and open areas, not inside buildings. Your environment should be somewhat less intense, in terms of the density of opposing forces and weapons, and the low likelihood of heavy weapons and indirect fire, but there are still significant hazards to moving in the open while adversaries can observe and engage you from covered and concealed locations inside buildings. If time allows, techniques of clearing and crossing danger areas (streets, alleys, intersections) can be methodical and resemble those used for interior hallways.

8.043 Identify and Utilize Last Covered or Concealed Position (LCC)
CONDITION: The team must assault a structure in the operating area, which is occupied by an armed adversary group. Use of lethal force is justified.
STANDARD: Identify a position as close as possible to the selected Point of Entry, which provides cover and/or concealment to the team, and which can be reached by covered routes or with the briefest exposure to enemy observation and fire. Move from ORP to LCC, avoiding detection and engagement.
DISCUSSION: The intent of an LCC is to minimize the time, distance, and exposure of an assaulting team in its final approach to the Point of Entry. Unless it is entirely hidden from the enemy and the team can reach it without being detected, it should be occupied only very briefly.

8.044 Enter Contested Building through Single or Multiple Points of Entry (POE)
CONDITION: The team must assault a structure in the operating area, which is occupied by an armed adversary group. Use of lethal force is justified.
STANDARD: Move from LCC to POE(s) minimizing exposure and casualties. Get team through the POE to establish a secure foothold inside structure.
TASK STEPS:

1. 1. Coordinate move from LCC with supporting elements to take advantage of suppressive fire, diversions, screening smoke or other measures to minimize exposure and avoid casualties.
   2. Preserve the element of surprise, to facilitate unopposed entry through the POE.
   3. Consolidate team prior to moving deeper into structure.

8.045 Conduct Team Movement through Hallways and Stairwells
CONDITION: The team is moving through a structure in the operating area, in contact or anticipating contact with an armed adversary. Use of lethal force is justified.
STANDARD: Negotiate hallways and stairwells, reacting to contact with controlled violence of action to preserve team momentum and minimize friendly casualties.
TASK STEPS:

1. 1. Maintain forward security, rear security, and cross coverage during movement. These responsibilities can rotate among individuals as the team flows forward. Momentary lapses in coverage can occur if forced by team size and the number or nature of danger areas encountered.
   2. Do not stop or linger in hallways or stairwells.
   3. Do not cross danger areas or leave them behind the team unless moving Direct to Threat (8.05)
   4. Maintain noise discipline and minimize verbal communication, in order to maintain the element of surprise.

8.046 Conduct Room Clearing Operations
CONDITION: The team is moving through a structure in the operating area, in contact or anticipating contact with an armed adversary. Use of lethal force is justified.
STANDARD: Clear each room encountered with appropriate techniques, neutralizing any adversary, minimizing friendly casualties and conducting cursory search for hazards, noncombatants, or critical assets,.
TASK STEPS:

1. 1. Clear methodically from hallway or exterior if time and threat situation allow.
   2. Conduct dynamic entry by at least two operators to complete clearance.
   3. Engage and neutralize, or disarm and restrain adversaries as necessary.
   4. Identify and safeguard noncombatants.
   5. Complete cursory search of room.
   6. Rejoin team and continue mission.

8.047 Consolidate and Reorganize in CQB
CONDITION: The team is moving through a structure in the operating area. Use of lethal force is justified. Team has engaged adversary, suffered casualties, or interacted with noncombatants or protected personnel. There is a lull in the action.
STANDARD: Check and confirm status of all team members through communications, observation, and buddy check. Reload, clear stoppages, recover and/or redistribute all needed equipment. Provide essential casualty care. Communicate with higher command and supporting elements.

8.05 Move Direct to Threat
CONDITION: Armed adversary is active in a known location in a structure and use of lethal force is justified.
STANDARD: Neutralize adversary, ensure safety and security of noncombatants, and avoid unnecessary delay or friendly casualties
TASK STEPS:

1. Identify threat location
2. Select advantageous route
3. Do not methodically clear en route to threat location
4. Move direct to threat, ensuring 360 degree security en route
5. Facilitate casualty care and lockdown or evacuation of noncombatants without slowing movement toward threat

8.06 Escort Principal(s)
CONDITION: TBD
STANDARD: TBD

8.07 Exfiltrate and Escape
CONDITION: An armed adversary group is active in the area of operations, and use of lethal force is justified. Friendly forces are unable to provide security in place for protected personnel or other critical assets, and a decision has been reached to evacuate the area.
STANDARD: Extract all identified personnel or critical assets from the area of operations and deliver them to a final or interim secure location.
TASK STEPS:

1. Select destination.
2. Select and ensure availability of secure route(s) and means of escape.
3. Engage adversary (ambush, defend, or delay) to cover movement of protected personnel/assets to and along escape route(s).
4. Provide forward, rear, and flank security during movement.
5. Provide reaction force for response to unexpected developments

DISCUSSION: Under extreme conditions, it may prove impossible to defend successfully in place, and when cognizant authority makes the decision to evacuate the area, security cadre must identify and clear escape routes, manage the movement, and provide security.

8.08 Conduct Hasty or Deliberate Ambush
CONDITION: Armed adversary group is active in the area of operations. Contact has not occurred. Use of lethal force is justified.
STANDARDS:
Select an ambush site that is tactically sound, properly established and secured.
Destroy the adversary when he enters the kill zone.
Minimize friendly and noncombatant casualties.
TASK STEPS:

1. Select a site that the adversary will enter, and that has terrain favorable to the ambusher.
2. Post security elements and establish an Objective Rally Point (ORP) and routes to it.
3. Establish linear, L-shaped, or other ambush formation with assault and support elements, suitable to the terrain and the expected adversary.
4. Initiate ambush.
5. Assault element sweeps through kill zone to confirm casualties, secure prisoners, weapons, and sensitive items.

DISCUSSION: An ambush is nothing more than a friendly force initiating contact with an adversary force, using the element of surprise. A hasty ambush is one that is set and then initiated swiftly when an approaching adversary is detected first; the task steps shown may be compressed, abbreviated, or ignored depending on the time available. A deliberate ambush is used when there is adequate time, confidence in the route(s) that adversaries will use, and adequate friendly forces and terrain. If the adversary appears too strong to be defeated, a well-concealed ambush may not initiate.

8.09 React to Ambush
CONDITION: An armed adversary group is active in the area of operations, and use of lethal force is justified. A friendly force is surprised by an ambush (heavy, concentrated fire in a pre-selected kill zone) while moving.
STANDARD: Ambushing force is defeated or driven off; friendly casualties are minimized.
TASK STEPS:

1. Team members in the kill zone get down, utilize any available cover, and return fire immediately, constituting a base of fire.
2. Team members not in the kill zone maneuver against the flank of the ambushing force.
3. The team leader directs the team to continue its attack against the ambushing force, or break contact, depending upon his assessment of the situation.

DISCUSSION: A common traditional counter-ambush IAD against a near ambush (closer than 50 meters) is for the entire friendly force to conduct an immediate frontal assault through the ambushers' position. Although sometimes this may be the only option, training this as the standard response would ensure that most operators will attempt to do it regardless of whether it is the only recourse, or even a remotely viable one. Frontal assaults without the element of surprise or overwhelming suppressive fire support, against prepared, alert defenders, have a very poor track record of success. The approach recommended here is in fact not an IAD, because it cannot be performed automatically in response to a stimulus, but requires thought and decisions by individuals and team leaders. It is the same response that most traditional sources recommend against a far ambush (from beyond 50 yards).

As Gunnery Sergeant John Poole (USMC) points out:
"When shot at unexpectedly, human beings react instinctively – they get down and crawl behind cover. If the personnel in the kill zone are not allowed to follow their natural instincts, their lives may be further endangered. . . Unless the ambushers are only a few steps away, the friendlies must get down. . . if squads train to conduct upright frontal assaults every time they get ambushed from less than 50 meters, they are inviting disaster." [footnote: H.J. Poole, The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO's Contribution to Warfare (Emerald Isle, NC: Posterity Press 1994), p. 153]

8.10 React to Chance Contact
CONDITION: An armed adversary group is active in the area of operations, and use of lethal force is justified. Friendly and enemy teams are both moving, and the friendly team detects the adversary first.
STANDARDS: The team defeats the enemy force by a hasty ambush (task 8.06) or a hasty flanking attack.
TASK STEPS:

1. Team member(s) who first spotted the adversary communicate direction and distance, continue to observe and maintain readiness to open fire upon command or if detected by the adversary
2. The team leader either deploys the remainder of the team into ambush positions IAW Task 8.06, or may decide that there is insufficient time to establish a hasty ambush before the team is detected by the adversary force.
3. If the team leader chooses to perform a hasty flanking attack, he will leave the team members who have visual contact in place as a base of fire, and deploy the remainder of the team stealthily toward one enemy flank, utilizing the most advantageous terrain. He will position himself so as to maintain visual contact with both elements, enabling them to coordinate fire and movement without voice or radio communications.

8.11 React to Non-Violent Protest or Demonstration
CONDITION: Non-violent protest or demonstration is underway within (or affecting) the area of operations. It may target our protected assets/activities or be coincidental, and not targeted directly upon us. Vandalism, sabotage, or other property damage may occur, and there is potential for escalation to violence against persons. .
STANDARDS: Maintain security and safety of protected personnel and assets, and protect integrity of grounds, structure, personal and organizational property by all legal means.
TASK STEPS:

1. Detect protestor/demonstrator plans and activity at the earliest possible moment.
2. Adjust activities, schedules, routes, and movements as possible to avoid or minimize direct contact or interaction with protestors/demonstrators.
3. If contact cannot be avoided, communicate with leaders/organizers to de-escalate tensions and reach a mutually acceptable resolution.
4. Request LEA response for crowd control, detention, and arrest if necessary
5. Interact with media as necessary.

DISCUSSION: In the era of flash mobs and social networking, protests can coalesce with great speed, so that prior detection and preparation may not be possible.

Particularly if your organization, property, or personnel are the targets of the protest or demonstration, direct contact can compromise security by focusing your attention, personnel, and efforts on the protest, creating gaps elsewhere which might be exploited by other potential threats. Security personnel are likely to be outnumbered and there may no legal justification for use of force.

Organized protests often have a leader or leadership cadre on scene. If contact is unavoidable, select a spokesperson with good communications skills, and attempt to contact the leader or organizer of the event. Protestor goals can differ, but media attention, video footage, or simply making a statement may satisfy them and create an opportunity for resolution of the situation. Seek a resolution that will de-escalate rather than escalate the situation, and restore normal conditions as soon as possible.

Media response is likely in the event of a large demonstration, and "the media" can range from cell phone video recording by individuals, to "new media" bloggers, to traditional media like newspapers, radio and TV. Media attention is usually a primary goal of any demonstration or protest; if that goal is met, the protest may disperse. Ignoring the media will seldom work to your advantage; treating the media in a hostile or adversarial fashion will result in bad publicity and may encourage the protestors or advance their cause. Be prepared to interact with the media; consider in advance who in your organization is comfortable and competent under these conditions and use that person as your point of contact.

8.12 Utilize Less Lethal Weapons and Techniques
CONDITION: Under normal or off-normal (emergency) operating conditions, security threats may occur that do not justify the use of lethal force.
STANDARDS:
Security personnel meet specific, legally defensible certification standards in the use of impact and electroshock weapons, chemical agents, restraints, and empty-hand control techniques.
Security personnel demonstrate mastery of force spectrum concepts and all applicable rules and legal requirements for the use of force.
Threats which occur are resolved with minimal impact on operations, and with minimal injury to suspects and friendly personnel.

After numerous TTXs and rehearsals, as well as live fire in a shoot house, it became evident that more than unassisted voice comms were needed.*

Fred decided to buy radios and accessories. After consulting with DSI, he added active hearing protection to protect hearing and improve coordination.

DSI recommended a GMRS radio with ear bud that would fit under active ear protection, while still allowing it to be used in day to day operations. Fred selected the Motorola RDV5100 VHF 10 Channel 5 Watt Radio. This radio works on both VHF and UHF and allows for privacy codes, is easily programmed, and nearly indestructible. It also allows for business growth without changing radios.

APD decided to run on low power in daily operations to avoid paying the Feds for a license. This also lowers their electronic signature. Fred and his team worked out a fielding plan.

Fred bought 25 radios and accessories and assigned them as:

5: Executives/Managers
5: Security Operators
4: Inventory
4: Production
1: Customer service
1: Contract security supervisor**
1: Marketing
1: Tech support
1: Clerical
1: Maintenance
1: Spare

This plan allows maximum information flow.

APD's use of the klaxon and PA as a warning and to pass initial information is excellent and will continue.

Because APD had a listening post running full time in the Tech Support room, APD knew what channels and frequencies were in regular use in the area. Fred's commo specialist assigned channels for day-to-day operations as well as assigning maneuver and evacuation channels, keeping things low profile and interference free.

APD's fielding went smoothly. Training was conducted on the radios and Fred incorporated radio procedures into TTX's and the radios into rehearsals and training. Having radio comms during live fire allowed the operators to spread out and still be able to coordinate their movements. Using the radios in daily operations kept folks proficient, kept radios charged, and improved operations.

The police department refused to loan APD a radio for emergencies. Fred simply told them APD would remain on the line with 911 and, after an area was cleared and secured, they'd hang an American flag out of the nearest door and the cops could come there. Fred also purchased 5x8 velcro backed American flags for his security forces to wear. The cops were briefed, and an affidavit was filed with APD's lawyer documenting the link up briefing. A copy was sent to the city attorney, certified mail.

Several employees expressed an interest in family communication plans and equipment. DSI will address this soon.

*They also added a gate and cameras on the fence for early warning and access control. Emergency switches to close the accordion doors without human assistance are on order.

** He knows his days are numbered. The $35K APD will save by providing in-house security renders him superfluous. APD has his resume and thinks he will make a fine Rangemaster once the range is fully operational.

TDG #APD-1:  Gang assault.

You are Fred Schmitt, CEO of Auto Parts Distributors, in your office.  It is 3:10pm Wednesday in Detroit.  APD’s plant shift ended ten minutes ago and upwards of 150 workers are heading for home.  At this moment, the building is still crowded, many workers are on foot in the parking lot, and some cars are already pulling out of the parking area and stacking up at the exit onto the street.

EXHIBIT 6.1 APD Gang assault.

Background: Your new security organization is not yet fully developed.  Four contract security guards (armed with handguns) are, as usual, in the building – at this time of day, you would expect two to be in the front lobby, one by the accordion doors in Shipping/Receiving, and the supervisor roaming through the building.  Your security cadre at this time consists of five managerial employees besides yourself who have trained for security response and have carbines or shotguns and associated kit in secure lockers in their workspace; drills have proven that retrieving gear and making ready takes about 30 seconds for a cadre member within a few steps of his locker.

Two minutes ago Floyd, your VP for operations, called you in your office to report that the last of your delivery vans, returning to the plant, called via cell phone to report that a group of young men loitering at an intersection on their route ran into the street, attempted to stop them, shouted and flashed gang signs, and then piled into two cars parked at the curb and are now following the van.

Now, over the usual level of noise at the end of a plant shift, you hear the screeching of tires from the direction of the gate opening onto the street in front of the building.  You see your delivery van entering the lot at a high rate of speed – the right side tires are almost off the ground as it makes the turn into the lot – but before you can turn to pick up the handset, two SUVs follow the delivery van through the gate and all hell breaks loose.

You hear the pop-pop-pop of gunfire, some of it with the louder and sharper report of rifle-caliber rounds.  You see the windows are down on both SUVs, muzzles extending out the passenger-side windows, and muzzle flashes on the driver’s side, as shots are fired into the vehicle and pedestrian traffic in the SW corner of the parking lot.  The delivery van disappears from your view around the front corner of the building, with one of the SUVs in close pursuit – you see a shooter leaning out of the window and firing ahead, presumably toward the delivery van in front.  The second SUV slews to the right and heads down the front of the building, towards you.  You see a short muzzle extending out the rear driver’s side window, and short bursts of automatic fire into the lobby, board room and first managerial offices are accompanied by the sounds of breaking glass and screaming.

What do you do now, Fred, both personally in the next few seconds and via communications and direction to your employees?

By developing specific scenarios based upon situations your team or unit might face, and working them with your own team, you can learn how your teammates think and respond in a tactical situation.  This knowledge will help you work together in the event of a real-life emergency.  

You can also use TDG’s to accomplish a quick test or ‘reality check’ of plans and tactical concepts.  Because they portray only a snapshot in time – a single decision point - they are not strong analytical tools but they can point out gaps or weaknesses in your system or your training.

APD AAR Example:

Fred Schmidt at APD had conducted a tabletop training exercise with his trained security personnel, contract security guards and department heads to familiarize them with the contingency plan for reacting to a hostile intrusion that you saw in Chapter 4.  He decided the next step was to conduct a full-scale drill.  As this was the first full walk through, he notified all key personnel in advance, and personally checked his armed security personnel to confirm that their primary weapons were unloaded, and that sidearms would remain holstered and concealed during the drill.  He felt this was a reasonable level of control for safety, since the real world threat environment could not be suspended for his convenience and he was unwilling to disarm his key people entirely for the duration of the drill.

He ran the drill at 2:00 on a Friday afternoon.  Upon its completion, he had his department heads debrief their employees for observations and lessons learned, and then release everyone for the weekend.  The AAR commenced at 3:30 in the APD conference room, with his five armed operators, the rest of his managers, the contract security guard supervisor, with Fred as facilitator.  It went like this:

FRED:  Thanks everyone for making this drill a success.  No one got hurt, and I think we’ve learned a lot.  You are my key people – we’re going discuss what went right, what we can improve upon, and how we can refine the plan.  Feel free to speak up whenever you have something to say, but let me start by laying down a structure for the discussion.

Our intent was to walk through our contingency plan for reacting to hostile intruders during the work day, in real time, to identify weak points in our planning, and determine if our expectations for key personnel are reasonable. The ‘crawl’ phase was our tabletop exercise in this room on Monday; this was the ‘walk’ phase. We’ll repeat this if we need to, and then we’ll move on to a full-speed ‘run’ when we all agree that we’re ready.

Today’s drill also had some training value for the entire workforce, because for them it was another rehearsal of our plan for responding to an active shooter.

We started the drill after securing all our external doors – which we did for safety and security so that visitors would not walk in on the drill in progress.  Of course this wouldn’t have been done in advance, if this had happened for real.  I then initiated the drill from my office with the agreed signal – the three-tone klaxon alarm over the PA system; if this happens for real, any of you may be the one that initiates the alarm.

Ten minutes later, the ‘musical chairs’ game was over – the music stopped, all movement was complete, and we ended the exercise.  From my perspective, it appeared that everyone was pretty much where we expected them to be, and that’s the key issue – that, and whether they got there as quickly and efficiently as we hoped.

Let’s go around the table and hear from each of you in turn.  Tell us what you did, what you saw, and where you think we can improve.  I asked you in advance to keep one eye on the clock, so give us time hacks for key events when you can – for instance, operators, when you were fully kitted up, and when you reached your assigned position; department heads, when your last worker reached a designated lock-down area and when your head count was complete.  I’ll take notes on the white board as we go, so we can build the picture; it’s important that each of you hear what was going on in areas that you couldn’t see or control during the drill.

Let’s start with the managers and supervisors and talk about how we got our people into lockdown; Tom, you were in charge in Marketing – you’re first: 

TOM BECK (Marketing Manager): Well, Fred, it was pretty simple for us.  I had 9 people in Marketing when we heard the alarm; that is, all 9 who were present today were in the room. Life might not have been so simple for me if any of them had been down the hall or in the restroom. Our room is a lockdown location, so all we had to do was stay put, keep the doors open long enough for the receptionist and foyer security guard to reach us, and then button up.  I positioned myself at the northern door on the long hallway as I knew those people were coming my way. As soon they were in the room (that only took about one minute), I locked that door and moved to the center hallway door, which I kept open so I could communicate with you and your armed folks and have an idea of what was going on.  I guess that’s not exactly ‘lockdown,’ but you talk a lot about situational awareness, and it seemed safe enough with you guys guns-up in both directions.  That’s all I’ve got.

GEORGE PEIROT (Controller, Oscar-2):  Fred, can I comment?  When I moved down the center hall toward my position at the hallway double doors, I saw Bob’s door open and stopped for a quick visual check – I saw Bob standing at the other, open door, and it was pretty clear what he was doing.  Still, I thought, what if the threat were coming down the long hall toward him and he didn’t get the door shut in time?  So I stopped across the hall from Marketing and tried to split my attention between Bob and my primary AOR, the shop area, until I saw Bob secure that first door. I didn’t feel too good about that.

FRED:  OK, George; noted.  We’ll come back to that.  Thanks, Tom.  Terry, you were in Customer Support; how did it go there?

TERENCE O’NEIL (Sales Manager, Oscar-5):  Well, as Tom said, it was simple enough for my people in the room, just shelter in place.  There was quite a rush through both doors as half the production floor came pouring in.  I know we struggled with the problem of assigning a lockdown room to individuals in production and inventory, because they all move around so much, but as it is we ended up with a lot of them heading to Customer Support and – I assume – the rest to Tech Support or wherever else they ended up, and it would have taken a long time and a lot of communication to sort out who was where and get an accurate head count.  Do you want me to cover my own actions as well, at this point, Fred?

FRED: No, hold that, Terry, until we get through the workforce piece.  Dudley?

DUDLEY SAGER (Production Manager): Fred, I was on the floor in Order Fulfillment.  Folks moved out smartly when the alarm sounded, so I thought I’d see how long it might take me to secure the accordion doors in shipping.  Of course they were already secured for this drill, but I moved to each door and stayed about as long as I thought it would take me to close and latch it.  About halfway through, Richard showed up to help.  When we were ‘done’ it was about two and a half minutes from the alarm and the production floor was deserted.  I ran back, thinking I’d dive into Customer Support, but both doors were closed and I figured if they were following instructions they wouldn’t let me in no matter how much I noise I made; so I ran across to Tech Support, where I saw Bill Harris standing in the open door.  Worked for me, but I didn’t like ending up separated from half of my own people.  I guess they organized themselves OK in Customer Support – somebody always steps up – but maybe we need to develop a chain of command in each department, or something.

FRED:  Good observation on chain of command; noted.  Thanks for taking the initiative on the outer doors, Dudley, that’s good information, too.  Richard?

RICHARD CLARKE (Inventory Manager): I was at the near (NE) end of the inventory area when the alarm sounded, so I spent the first minute or so hustling my people (and some of Dudley’s) along toward Tech Support.  That room filled up fast, and there was a bottleneck at the doors, so I sent a bunch of them up the hall toward the break room.  As the crowd thinned, I saw Dudley going through the motions over by the big doors and remembered that was partly my responsibility too, so I joined him.  As he said, we probably could have gotten all those doors closed in 2-3 minutes – which would work as long as the Mongols are not already at the gate.  I ended up in Tech Support myself – the first open door into a secure area that I could find.  We may need to think more about traffic flow – we’ve got 120 people out on the production floor, and they’ll pile up fast at a few points if we don’t manage their movement a little more.  I know that’s like herding cats, and it won’t work out perfectly, but I think we end up with more people exposed for longer by letting them decide for themselves where to go, and then piling up in knots at a few doors.  Just my opinion.

FRED:  Yeah, I’m seeing a pattern here.  Regarding the doors – do you see a better solution?  

RICHARD:  Well, the obvious one is that you have a security guard posted in Shipping and Receiving – maybe the doors should become his primary responsibility.  With the doors already secured for this exercise, maybe he didn’t think of that as his task, but it seems reasonable.  Another approach may be for me – or Dudley, or each of us – to designate a couple of our people as door monitors; we can’t be sure that any one person will be down at that end at any particular moment, but redundancy is a good thing, right?

FRED:  OK.  We’ll come back to that; I think you’re on the right track.  Let’s move on though for now. Bill, anything to add about Tech Support as a lockdown area?  We’ll get to your security role in a minute.

BILL HARRIS (Technical Support, Oscar-4): No, Mr. Schmidt.  Richard’s points are all good from my point of view.  

FRED:  All right then.  Floyd, do you want to cover the rest of the folks that started in the front end of the building?

FLOYD STANDING (VP Operations): First, Fred, I think Richard is on to something, too. The break room is a good secure location, and could take a lot more people than were there this afternoon.  With the outside door secure, the only way in is from the central hall, so those doors can stay open as long as you’ve got armed people holding the.  Make that the primary destination for half of Dudley’s Production crew, and you’ll take the pressure off of Tech Support.  It’s a little farther for them to move, but it will relieve some of the congestion.  Anyway, up front, we only had myself, Mike Einheit, the receptionist, the front security guard, and a couple of admin folks, and that they split between Marketing and the break room; everybody was in one place or the other within a minute or so.

FRED:  OK, we’ve got a pretty good picture of how the employees responded.  I’ve got some ideas on how to improve that piece, but let’s hear the security perspective.  In particular, you’ve got me wondering whether our positions really are the best, and if you can get to your posts and be effective while we’ve got all that foot traffic running through and past you.  First, though, I’d like to hear from the security guards.  Derek, you had your usual crew of three, one man in the reception area, one in Shipping and Receiving, and yourself roaming.  How did things go for you?

DEREK HUNTER (Contract security guard supervisor): Mr. Schmitt, you didn’t assign us much responsibility here, and I think we can do more for you.  I understand that you are depending on your own folks now, if something serious breaks loose, and you know I’m limited by my standing orders, and by what my guys are trained and equipped for, but we don’t want to lose your business, and I think there’s got to be more that we can do for you.  Don’t count us out.  Here’s what we did – and could have done. 

Gil Baca, up front, moved to the lobby entrance, kind of like Mr. Sager did in back, figuring that if trouble wasn’t already through those front doors, he’d secure them before he did anything else.  Then he checked the front restrooms and the office storage room, made sure everyone was out of that area, checked the board room on his way down the hall, and then – because by then he saw your men in position at the intersection, he popped across into Marketing as he’d been instructed, and stayed there ‘til you called the EndEx.

Robert was in Shipping and Receiving when the alarm sounded, and Mr. Clarke called that right.  I think that if any of the doors had been open, he would have closed them ASAP; but you know these drills are a little artificial sometimes, and since you already had us close all the doors prior to the exercise, he just played it as he saw it.  He tried to help with the traffic jam over at Tech Support, but nobody paid much attention to him, so he popped across to Customer Support and went to ground there.  He said your guys were getting organized in there pretty good.

I was in the central restroom when it started – when you gotta go, you gotta go, right? As quick as I could get buckled up, I headed out, colliding with Mr. Terry on his way to post in that doorway.  I figured he had that covered, so I moved into the central hallway, and that’s where I was when you showed up, Mr. Schmitt.  I guess that was sort of your command post, and it seemed as good a place as any for me to be.  If we’d taken the exercise any further – if we had any actual bad guys – I was thinking that Gil and I could have provided some backup to your folks if you had to take people down.  We carry ASP batons, flex cuffs and handcuffs, and we train with them; we could move behind you and secure suspects if or when you move out to sweep the building – kind of what we used to call a ‘follow-on’ role when I trained for MOUT with the MPs a few years ago.  I wish I could do more, but that seems like a pretty useful supporting role.

FRED: OK, Derek, that’s a good idea, and we’ll see what we can do with it.  I’d need to be confident that other supervisors – if you’re not here – and all the guards you guys might send to us are on board with the concept, so at the least they need to be in your post instructions.  We’ll talk more about this later.  Let Gil know I appreciate his initiative and thoroughness in the front of the building; that’s exactly what we need from him.

Now we’re down to our actions as armed operators.  Let’s review it by the numbers: George Patton, you are Oscar-1.

GEORGE PATTON (HR Manager, Oscar-1): Fred, my task is simple.  I grabbed my rifle and my kit from the locker in about 30 seconds – great idea to use those vaults with the touchpads, they’re fast and I’ve got the key for a backup.  The go-bag is great too, you can just throw the strap over your neck and move.  I ducked across the hall and was in place at the hallway intersection 40 seconds after the alarm.  I watched Gil coming down the hall from the foyer; that was well done, and it got me thinking whether I should post farther up that hall myself – I wouldn’t have been able to intervene if there were trouble up there, except by shooting, and that’s not always the answer.  

FRED: Noted, George, but until our numbers grow, I don’t want one guy forward without support – too many things can go wrong.  From the hallway intersection, you have visual control of the north hall, your back is covered, and we have good comms.  When we have more personnel, we’ll take a hard second look, but for now, I think this is the best we can do.  “George 2” – Oscar-2 – what about you?

GEORGE PEIROT (Controller, Oscar-2): Fred, initially things were as smooth for me as for “George 1” – sorry – Oscar-1.  I got my kit and moved down the center hall toward the double fire doors. As I said earlier, the situation in Marketing was a bit of a distraction for a minute, and with the scene out on the production floor, I didn’t feel like I had much control over anything.  I know there was some order to it, but 120 people hopping and popping to get off the production floor all at the same time was a bit of a spectacle.  Even before Richard diverted a bunch of them toward me, it was practically impossible for me to figure out what was going on.  If there had been intruders in the production area, I wouldn’t have been able to pick them out of the crowd for the first minute or two, and they could have been on me, intermingled with our folks, before I could do much.  Bill Harris showed up in his door in front of me – and from his thumbs up I concluded that Terry was in position too, though I couldn’t see him myself – and at that point the pressure was off.  I guess that happened within a minute or two, but it seemed like longer.  I let the rest of the folks off the floor flow past me and tried to keep visual contact with both Harris and the guys in the intersection until you – and Derek – showed up behind me.  

HANNAH SCHMITT (VP Sales and Marketing, Oscar-3): I guess I’m next.  I was two doors down the hall in Mike Einheit’s office when the alarm sounded.  I figured I was close enough to get to my office for my kit, so that’s what I did.  I suppose I would have gone farther even than that, as long as the outside door next to your office, Fred, was secure; I really don’t want to go into a situation like this without my primary weapon and the rest of my kit.  After that, I moved to the intersection where Patton – Oscar 1 - was, and covered the SW hallway per instructions; got there maybe half a minute after George and George.  I had a thought similar to his – assuming that you were still in your office, Fred, I hated retreating down the hall away from you. Should we consider linking up and moving together?  It would mean I’d probably be slower reaching my position, but you’d have a bit of security if still think it makes sense to make the 911 call from your office before moving.  That’s all I’ve got.

FRED (CEO, Oscar-6): OK, good so far.  At least no one ad libbed too much on this run.  It’s good that you stuck to the plan and brought your second thoughts to the AAR.  

I’ll jump in here since my story relates to what Hannah just said.  I grabbed my own kit, then simulated a 90 second emergency call.  When I came out into the hall, I realized I was stepping into Hannah’s field of fire and while I trust her and think she still like me well enough, it was a little unnerving to be staring down her muzzle.  I realized I should probably have signaled “Coming Out” before running out into the hall.  I also realized, by time I turned the corner and put all of you between me and the unknown, that there’s no good reason for me to linger in my office to make an emergency call.  Once we’re consolidated, we can use a phone in Marketing or the break room, or a cell phone, for any and all calls.  That much I’m changing for sure.

OK, continuing – Oscar-4, that’s you, Mr. Harris.

BILL HARRIS (Technical Support, Oscar-4): Mr. Schmitt, everybody’s noted how much of a cluster it was for the first couple of minutes, while the production floor emptied.  Like Oscar-2, I didn’t feel like I had much control over what was going on out there, and in my final position, at the south door from Tech Support, I had good comms – eye contact with Terry and Oscar-2 – but I couldn’t see two-thirds of the production floor.  Anything could have been going on out there, but until a bad guy came around my near corner ten yards away, I wouldn’t know he was there.  I guess the mutual support argument really does make sense, but I’ll be a lot happier when we have a few more people and set up to maintain a field of view over the entire production floor.  Here’s thought – would it make sense to post Terry – Oscar-5 at the west end of the divider wall, instead of at the restroom door?  He and I would still have visual contact with each other, he’d have a good field of view over most of the production floor, and his rear would be covered IF the east door into that hall were secured.  Just a thought.

FRED:  That’s worth thinking about, Bill – we’ll have to do a walk through and check the angles. I sure don’t want to do anything at this point that puts any one of us in a position that doesn’t have his six covered by at least one other operator; but if we were sure that east door could be secured, maybe it could work.  Terry?  

TERENCE O’NEILL (Sales Manager, Oscar-5):  Fred, I was thinking about that. It could work, if my first move out of Customer Support were directly to that east door.  If we could limit the number of floor workers coming through that door, I could secure it myself and then move to the west end of the hall, where Bill’s talking about.  Between Bill and Oscar-2 at the fire doors, I’d have my rear covered until I made that move.  Maybe.  Depending on how fast the crowd clears.  I don’t have much else to report – I had my kit in hand in about half a minute, like everyone else, and except for colliding with Derek in the restroom door, I was on station pretty fast, less than a minute.  The traffic didn’t slow me down much, because the restroom wasn’t anybody’s destination at that point.  On this whole topic of securing the production floor, I think what we have now is a pretty good plan for protecting our people, but we’re giving up control of our inventory, and I’m not happy about that.  We don’t want to get over-extended, but if we can tweak the plan to hold on to more of our ground, I’ll be happier.

FRED:  All right then, that’s a pretty complete picture of what happened today.  Overall, it seems like everybody stuck to the plan, with some improvisations that point to areas we can improve.  And you’ve raised some good points. Let me see if I can capture the main points that we want to address, moving forward:

We need to incorporate the security guards more effectively into the plan.  I will talk to Derek and his management to see what we can do.  This is no reflection on you Derek, or your guards – but OPSEC (operational security) is a concern. I will not share APD’s contingency plans with anyone outside this company, so we’ll have to see what we can accomplish working with the security contractor short of sharing the full plan.  Derek’s ideas are solid and we’ll start from there.

Safety and common sense required that we secure the external doors before starting the drill today, so we didn’t really simulate the time and effort of doing so under threat, except through Dudley and Mr. Baca’s initiative.  Maybe we can do some limited performance tests before or after hours next week to get a better idea of what’s possible; Floyd, take the lead on that, will you?  Keep me informed.

We need to do more of a ‘traffic analysis’and come up with a better scheme of getting the workforce into lockdown, avoiding choke points and distributing the numbers better.  The main question is how and where to guide the 120 folks off the production floor.  Floyd, I think this is your area too, but you need to work closely with Peirot, Harris and O’Neill, who are your operators.  While you’re at it, give some thought to how we can maintain better coverage and control over the inventory and production floor without sacrificing mutual support and comms.  Whatever ideas you come up with, tabletop them; I don’t want to do another full-scale exercise until we’ve got something we’re confident of.  

Also – and this is for everyone to think about – we need to come up with some way to get a head count once the movement has stopped.  Clearly we had work groups separated among several lockdown rooms, and that will make it hard to know that we’ve got all our people safe.  And although people improvised well, we probably need to have a plan and prior designation of who’s going to be in charge in each room.

Hannah, as I said earlier, your comment is well-taken.  I will not linger in my office; I’ll link up with you if you’re in yours, and move with you, rather than follow you, up the hall to the intersection without delay.  I can make my calls – and assume command of the situation – from there.  

We talked about pushing our security farther up or down the long hall, but I am not prepared to scatter our thin resources at this time.  

I want to be able to secure the core of building; I want 6-9 capable armed operators who can communicate with and support one another; and I want protection for the workforce once they’re relocated into lockdown; those are our objectives; that’s my “commander’s intent” if you will.  If we can’t get advance warning before the threat is through the door or on the skin of the building, trying for more at this point is dangerous overreach.  

That said, it’s clear to me that we need more trained personnel, quickly.  For that matter, it would be a bad day, if we had to execute this plan under threat on a day that any two of you were out sick or on vacation.  I’ll want prioritized recommendations from each department head of your best candidates, as soon as possible, and we’ll get the courses scheduled.

Folks, unless anyone has anything else right now, I think we’re done.  Good effort on everyone’s part; I feel a lot more confident now than I did this morning, that we can handle the trouble that may be coming.  There’s plenty of work ahead but this was a good start.  Have a great weekend.